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On the causes of economic growth in Europe:  
Why did agricultural labour productivity not converge between 
1950 and 2005? 
1. Introduction 
The literature on the causes of modern economic growth has hosted one of the most 
heated recent debates in economics. Rather than traditional so-called proximate causes, some 
more innovative research has insisted on the crucial role of fundamental causes, such as 
geography, institutions, trade or culture (Acemoglu et al. 2001 and 2005; Frankel and 
Rommer 1999; Sachs and Warner 1995; Sachs 2000). This debate, developed principally by 
economists, has frequently employed historical data to validate the hypotheses proposed. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that its impact has deeply affected economic history research, in 
which the analysis of the causes of economic growth has habitually been a central topic. 
In the case of European economic growth, a significant number of European 
economic historians have used comparative perspectives to address this question
1
. Such 
literature addresses this central problem of the causes of and obstacles to modern economic 
growth by analysing the rhythms and patterns of European economic development over the 
last two centuries.  
For economic historians, European industrialisation and its successes, failures and 
rhythms have probably been one of the most relevant questions. Nevertheless, in the last two 
decades, the reasons explaining the extremely rapid growth in the years of the Golden Age 
and its abrupt ending in the 1970s, have also generated a debate of great interest (Temin 
2002; Vonyo 2008; Eichengreen and Ritschl 2009). 
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A recent synthesis can be found in Broadberry and O’Rourke (2010). 
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The changes in agriculture and their influence on economic development have 
occupied a central place in the industrialisation debate (Allen, 2009; O’Brien and Prados 
1992; Van Zanden 1991; Lains and Pinilla 2009). Surprisingly, in the discussion regarding 
economic growth in the Golden Age the debate has only centred on the possible contribution 
to economic growth made by the exit of labour power from agriculture (Temin 2002; Vonyo 
2008). However, the analysis in the second half of the XX century of the causes of changes 
in the agricultural sector itself and their contribution to general economic growth, from a 
long-term perspective, have produced less interest. The most notable exception is the 
seminal study by Federico (2005), which tackles such causes for the world as a whole and 
from the perspective of two centuries
2
. The same is not true of agricultural economists, for 
whom agricultural growth in these decades, its causes and international differences have 
been a central topic (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Fuglie 2010 and 2012). However, these 
studies have normally lacked a long-term perspective. 
This scanty interest is surprising, bearing in mind that agricultural productivity 
increased fastest in these years. Furthermore, for many countries on the continent, by the 
1960s the agricultural sector still employed most labour power and, additionally, made a 
substantial contribution to GDP. Moreover, the sector underwent other crucial changes. 
Firstly, it moved from having weak links with other sectors to becoming a sector in which 
the majority of inputs came from the industrial sector, which also purchased a very 
significant part of agricultural output for its subsequent transformation. Secondly, agriculture 
came to benefit from considerable state intervention. In Western Europe, agricultural policies 
had a decisive weight in the development of this sector, replacing the market to a 
considerable degree. In Eastern Europe, collectivization involved total control by the state. 
Against this background, the present article aims to make a contribution to 
explaining the causes of and the differences in economic growth on the European continent, 
concentrating on the agricultural sector in the second half of the XX century. The principal 
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 The studies by Grigg (1982) and Bairoch (1999) have also touched upon this subject.  
4 
 
objective is to determine why the productivity of agricultural labour has not converged in 
Europe in the last 60 years. This absence of convergence occurred in the period in which the 
European-wide diffusion of technologies took place, significantly advancing the frontiers of 
production possibilities. Specifically, the study offers a long-term analysis of agricultural 
labour productivity differences in Europe. This issue is essential, since agricultural 
modernisation and its positive contribution to economic development require a substantial 
increase in productivity, which also permits a significant transfer of labour power to other 
sectors.  It is also extremely important because it offers a good approximation of production 
and income per worker in this sector. Some recent studies have emphasised that since 
differences in agricultural productivity are greater than in the economy as a whole, their 
understanding is key to the comprehension of the differences in income per worker among 
countries, and especially developing countries (Gollin et al., 2014 a). 
As for shorter periods in agricultural economics, the present article systematically 
compares the evolution of European countries, using econometric techniques to provide 
explanations. To achieve the objective proposed, in addition to the so-called proximate 
causes of economic growth we shall also use variables which permit the introduction into the 
analysis of the role of fundamental causes, especially institutional or geographical factors. 
The study period is particularly interesting, as it experienced the greatest growth in 
agricultural productivity in the last two centuries (Martín-Retortillo and Pinilla, 
forthcoming). Most previous analyses have employed a highly heterogeneous sample of 
countries and reduced time periods. The present study extends the usual time horizon and 
analyses almost all the countries of Europe, except for the former Soviet republics, for which 
homogenous data are extremely difficult to obtain.  
To be able to construct not only the descriptive statistics but also the econometric 
analyses, we found it necessary to compile a homogeneous database which fully covers the 
1950-2005 period and which further includes all the countries of the European continent 
(with the exception of the ex-Soviet Union and its successor republics) (see Appendix). Our 
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principal source is the FAOSTAT (2009) database and the paper yearbooks of the FAO 
(1948-2004). As explained in detail in the Appendix, the principal problems we have faced 
are related to the absence of net agricultural production data for the decade of the 1950s, 
territorial changes (especially in the case of the two Germanys prior to reunification, for 
which, additionally, there exist data for neither net production nor other variables) and the 
calculation of the human capital stock. All this has required the estimation of variables and 
their homogenisation (see Appendix). 
The results show the importance of the land/labour ratio in understanding the lack of 
convergence in European labour productivity levels. That is to say, factors from outside the 
agricultural sector itself, namely the capacity of other sectors to attract agricultural workers, 
are very important for the explanation of labour productivity differences. Also significant 
were the endowments of fertilizers, machinery, irrigated land or livestock capital per worker. 
This article argues that the exodus of workers and the far-reaching implementation of new 
production technologies contributed to increasing productivity levels. Lastly, the institutional 
framework was also of great importance. Especially in Western European countries, 
membership of the European Union encouraged high levels of productivity. For Eastern 
European countries, relatively low productivity levels were maintained, due to the 
centralised planning of their economies. The policies subsidising agriculture had a negative 
effect on productivity. In addition, geographical conditions also help to explain productivity 
differences. In short, we believe that this discussion permits deeper debate regarding the 
causes of European economic growth in the long term.  
 The article comprises six sections, including this introduction. Section 2 examines 
the evolution of agricultural productivity in Europe and analyses absolute convergence. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical model constructed, the econometric methodology followed 
and the variables employed. Section 4 discusses the results obtained. In section 5 we perform 
an analysis of agricultural productivity with a dynamic specification. Finally, Section 6 
presents the principal conclusions. 
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2. The evolution of agricultural labour productivity in Europe 
2.1. Agricultural labour productivity changes in Europe  
 Three stages can be distinguished in the evolution of labour productivity in European 
agriculture over the last two centuries. The first, between 1800 and 1870, was one of growth 
which was continuous and moderate but very unequal among countries. New techniques 
were adopted, such as crop rotations, the introduction of pulses and other fodder crops, the 
elimination of fallow periods, improved implements, more intensive fertilizing and new 
fertilizers such as guano (Allen 1992 and 1994; Clark 1987). The average annual growth of 
labour productivity was 0.93% in developed countries (data from Bairoch 1999). 
The second stage was 1870-1950, in which annual growth accelerated to 1.23% in 
developed countries. The use of chemical fertilizers, biological innovations, reaping and 
threshing machines, new metal instruments and concentrated feeds were all causes of this 
growth (Chorley 1981; Van Zanden 1991; Olmstead and Rhode 2002 and 2008; Federico 
2003).   
The greatest annual growth in productivity (4.73% on average) took place from the 
Second World War to the end of the XX century in developed countries. This was due to the 
increasing use of self-propelled machinery, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, the genetic 
selection and hybridisation of seeds, the development of intensive industrial livestock 
raising, improved access to agricultural credit and the expansion of irrigated farming in the 
Mediterranean countries (Grigg 1992; Gardner 1996; Federico 2005a; Josling 2009).  
 To analyse the period 1950-2005 more precisely, Table 1 offers our own calculation 
of agricultural labour productivity in Europe as a whole, and its agricultural production and 
principal productive factors
3
. To obtain labour productivity, we divided net production in 
dollars at international prices in 1999-2001 by the total active agricultural population. 
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 Farm production does not include forestry products. 
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Average annual European growth in this period was 4.23%, the highest rate in the last two 
centuries.  
[Table 1] 
Labour productivity growth was especially rapid until the early 1980s, increasing 
somewhat more slowly from then on. This growth was based on a substantial increase in 
production until the beginning of that decade, after which it rose very slowly. Meanwhile, 
the fall in the active agricultural population was prolonged and sustained, and especially fast 
after the 1980s. 
The growth of production in the first stage, 1950-1982, resulted from a sharp 
increase in the use of modern inputs, such as fertilizers and machinery, while the cultivated 
land area fell slightly. In the second stage of stagnant production, 1982-2005, cultivated land 
decreased further, as did the number of livestock units and, particularly, the use of fertilizers. 
The number of tractors subsequently rose very slowly. This meant that the maintenance of 
production, while the use of productive factors fell, was only possible as a result of a notable 
increase in TFP (Martín-Retortillo and Pinilla, forthcoming).  
By disaggregating the evolution of labour productivity by countries it is possible to 
show the very different patterns followed (Table 2). 
Throughout the period, Western European countries had productivity levels far 
above European averages, and productivity growth higher than the Continental norm. Their 
highest levels of productivity, in 1950, can be explained by their advantage in terms of 
economic development. They completed their processes of industrialisation earlier, which 
means that their structural change was also more advanced. This involved a greater exit of 
the rural population to industry and services and the necessary replacement of the 
agricultural labour force by machinery. The result is that they started from a higher level of 
labour productivity, while the adoption of new innovations and the deepening of structural 
change allowed them to maintain that advantage. These countries display different 
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evolutions. The United Kingdom or the Netherlands have displayed decelerating growth in 
recent years, despite their high initial level (Brassley 2000). Others, for example France and 
Denmark, have been able to maintain high growth rates. Swiss productivity had an unusual 
low growth due to its flat production increase and a lower decrease in the active population 
than the rest of the Western countries. 
The Nordic countries experienced greatly varying levels of agricultural productivity, 
but ranged around the European average. From 1950 to 2005 their growth was lower than or 
similar to European growth, which meant a loss of their relative positions on the continent. 
 [Table 2] 
In 1950 productivity in the Mediterranean countries (except Italy) was lower than in 
Europe as a whole, and two different trajectories are apparent. One is the very strong growth 
of Spain and Italy, while Greece and Portugal were clearly outpaced by this sharp rise in 
production. 
 Lastly, the active agricultural population in the Eastern European countries was 
much less productive than in Europe as a whole. Growth from 1950 to 2005 was extremely 
heterogeneous. Despite this heterogeneity, these countries and the Soviet Union incorporated 
many of the innovations being adopted by other European countries. This led to notable 
increases in production between 1960 and 1990 (Diamond et al. 1983). Consequently, 
agricultural labour productivity increased in the Eastern countries prior to the collapse of 
Communism. In the 1990s, by contrast, agricultural production declined, due to the 
implosion of the centrally planned economies. The transition to a market economy shows 
great differences in the evolution of labour productivity, although once such differences had 
been overcome these countries returned to the path of growth (Macours and Swinnen 2002).  
Finally, Table 2 shows that although the growth of labour productivity in different 
European countries was extremely important, very significant differences persisted in their 
levels. In 2005 labour productivity in Germany or Western European countries was twice as 
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high as in the Mediterranean or Nordic countries, despite some of the latter having 
experienced very strong productivity growth. In addition, in Western European countries 
labour productivity levels were six times higher than the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC). 
[Graph 1] 
For a better understanding of these differences, labour productivity can be 
disaggregated into two components: land productivity and land-labour ratio. 
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), where Y is output, A is land and L is labour. 
Graph 1 (and Table A.1 in the Appendix) show the evolution and levels of 
productivity per hectare in European agriculture. The highest levels correspond to the 
countries of Western Europe. Followed at some distance are those of the Mediterranean 
countries and, especially, those of the Nordic and Central and Eastern European countries. It 
is reasonable to assume that, to a large degree, these differences could have been due to the 
distinct agricultural potentialities of the natural resources of the different countries. 
[Graph 2] 
Graph 2 (and Table A.2 in the Appendix) offer land-labour ratios. They demonstrate 
that low land-productivity countries, although they tended to increase their land-labour ratios 
to achieve high labour productivity, did not reach the elevated levels of Western Europe. The 
Nordic or Spanish land-labour ratios reached the same level as Western countries or 
Germany, but did not offset their disadvantage in land productivity (Wang et al. 2012). The 
land-labour ratios of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and some Mediterranean 
countries, such as Greece or Portugal, were much lower than the rest of Europe. 
 
2.2. Did the labour productivity of European agriculture converge? 
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 From the general increase in agricultural labour productivity, the massive 
incorporation of new industrial inputs and the biological innovations adopted, it might be 
assumed that the differences among countries should have fallen. The access to technology 
capable of generalised application to the entire continent may have fostered convergence. 
The task is now to determine whether the productivity levels of agricultural labour 
converged. Table 3 shows that the dispersion of productivity (-convergence) increased 
gradually or was maintained since the 1950s. 
[Table 3] 
Table 3 shows that the differences in labour productivity existing within the 
continent of Europe in 1950 did not decrease until the 1980s. From then on, dispersion 
displayed small fluctuations or a slight decrease, depending on the measure observed. In the 
case of the weighted variation coefficient, it is possible to observe similar behaviour to that 
of the remaining variables, although the change of trend occurred in approximately 1970. 
Thus, the evolution of the indicators of dispersion in Table 3 permit us to affirm that 
convergence did not exist in labour productivity. The question is now how to explain why 
such important differences in agricultural productivity levels in Europe have been 
maintained until today, without convergence among countries. Consequently, we perform an 
econometric analysis to observe the variables which explain these differences in levels.  
3. Theoretical approach and method 
Labour productivity is the partial productivity of agriculture which has grown fastest 
in Europe since World War II (Henrichsmeyer and Ostermeyer-Schlöder 1988). This growth 
is directly linked to the exit of the agricultural population to industry and services as a 
consequence of structural change, since agricultural labour is the denominator of this 
variable. Consequently, either increased production or reduced labour, or a combination of 
the two, could have raised productivity.  
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Many causes determine labour productivity levels, from factor endowment and 
technology to institutions or geography. As both recent economic history and the literature 
on economic growth show, there exist both proximate and fundamental causes to explain 
agricultural productivity variations (Crafts 2010). The present study attempts to combine 
both types of variables. 
Proximate causes are the variables included in any production function of the 
agricultural sector (land and capital), except, obviously, the labour factor, which is already 
the labour productivity denominator. These productive factors have normally been included 
in all estimations of agricultural productivity (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Kawagoe et al. 
1985; Gallup 1998 or Mundlak et al. 1999, among many others). Machinery and fertilisers 
have significantly increased their importance in the productive process, in line with 
agricultural development (Grigg 1992; Federico 2005a). The irrigated land area is another 
crucial variable, because of its importance in overcoming unfavourable geographical 
conditions in certain semi-arid European regions. Less commonly, livestock variables have 
been included in the estimation of agricultural productivity. These affect production in two 
ways: as capital which, in addition to producing goods, lasts more than one financial year, 
and as a driving force in farming. In the years under analysis, in addition to a radical 
reduction of the contribution of animals to rural labour, their importance as capital increased, 
as intensive livestock farming emerged.  
The quality of the labour force is also a variable to be taken into account. In fact, 
human capital is one of the variables most commonly studied to observe differences in 
agricultural labour productivity (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Nguyen 1979). 
We also introduce GDPpcit as a measure of the development of the whole economy. 
There are several studies which take this variable into account to measure differences in 
agricultural productivity (Van Zanden 1991; Mundlak et al. 1999; Ezcurra et al. 2011). Our 
understanding is that agricultural labour will be more productive in more developed 
economies. This is due to the influence of the greater technological level, external to 
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agriculture, on its productivity, or the impact on agricultural efficiency of the availability of 
better infrastructure and access to markets. 
The fundamental causes of modern economic growth are also taken into account in 
the present analysis. Certain institutions can significantly affect productivity, influencing for 
example the propensity to trade, the adoption of technology, investment incentives or human 
capital skills. Prominent among these determinants are the functioning of product or factor 
markets, agricultural credit, foreign trade policy or economic policy.  
It is a complex task to measure all the possible channels of institutional influence 
upon the productivity of such a large sample of countries, and thus the focus here is on those 
most important and easiest to observe. Membership of either the European Union (formerly 
the European Economic Community) or of the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, 
have had extremely significant consequences. For some authors these are essential to the 
understanding of agricultural output in Western and Eastern Europe (Houpt et al. 2010). In 
addition, international trade openness and subsidies to agriculture are also important 
dimensions in the development of the institutional framework of the countries analysed 
(Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008). Some of these latter institutional dimensions overlap with 
the former (EU and Communist bloc membership) but, given the number of countries 
involved and the long time span, undoubtedly make the analysis richer. 
EU membership has entailed the adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and access to the common market of member countries. The CAP has radically altered their 
agricultural perspectives, involving a partial substitution of market mechanisms by public 
policies (Federico 2009; Spoerer 2010). The creation of, firstly, a customs union and, 
secondly, a single, strongly protected, market has greatly facilitated import substitution and 
increased trade among members (Pinilla and Serrano 2009). Measures such as export 
subsidies and minimum prices have provided help to farmers and supported the agricultural 
sector by trading at prices above international levels (Tracy 1989; Ritson 1997; Andreosso-
O’Callaghan 2003; García Delgado and García Grande 2005).  
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In the Soviet bloc land was collectivised, rationing was introduced and products 
were requisitioned; essentially, central planning replaced the market economy. Land was 
either transferred to the state or maintained in private hands. Owners were obliged to join 
cooperative enterprises while a small part of their production was allowed to remain strictly 
private. Collective farms increased mechanisation, yet despite lower labour requirements, the 
collectivised farms “became employers of last resort, providing a meagre subsistence to 
women and children, the old and the infirm” (Allen 2003, p. 100). The Soviet countries also 
threatened peasants failing to comply with planners’ orders, producing general discontent 
with the system and a tendency towards passive protest. Moreover, production did not 
usually equate with demand. From the economic point of view, socialist agriculture suffered 
great structural problems of incentivisation. This was because, following collectivisation, all 
agricultural workers were guaranteed a minimum income, with little incentive to work 
harder. Similarly, efficient agricultural policies were lacking, further causing state 
agriculture to perform beneath its potential (Gregory and Stuart 2001; Allen 2003; Federico 
2005a and 2005b; Landau and Tomaszewski 1985).  
Support to the agricultural sector through highly diverse measures, such as 
guaranteed prices, direct income transfers to farmers, purchases of surpluses, structural 
reform policies or protectionist policies may also have had a significant impact on 
productivity. On the one hand, subsidies to agriculture, by maintaining or raising the income 
of farmers above the level they would otherwise have had, may have reduced or impeded a 
greater growth of productivity. It might therefore have limited or deferred the exit of the 
labour force from the sector, with a negative effect on productivity. It is also possible that as 
a consequence of offering more stable perspectives to farmers, such policies would have 
incentivised capital investment in farms, thereby favouring the improvement of productivity. 
International trade openness may also have affected agricultural productivity. It is 
reasonable to believe that in the more open countries it was necessary to increase 
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competitiveness further, in order to be able to maintain their production in an environment of 
low protection. 
Geography is another fundamental cause of growth. Geographic variables may 
directly affect agriculture through temperature, altitude, rainfall, sunshine, pestilence and 
diseases, soil, orography or latitude (Gallup 1998; Grigg 1992; Crosby 1986; Asenso-Okyere 
et al. 2011). As altitude rises temperature falls, harming agricultural output (Grigg 1982; 
Federico 2005a). More decisive may be the fact that steeper slopes demand greater intensity 
of labour. Several studies have underlined that a highly uneven terrain prejudices agriculture 
and other economic activities (Nunn and Puga 2012; Ayuda et al. 2010). A lack of water can 
also hinder productivity; for some countries it is a clear obstacle to agricultural development 
(González de Molina 2001; Clar and Pinilla 2009). Water is an essential resource for plant 
growth, and the impact on its lack of output is huge unless appropriate measures are taken. 
Some research includes measurements of the bioclimatic landscape, to determine the 
disadvantage for tropical, polar or temperate countries (Gallup 1998). Such landscapes are 
sets of climate, flora and fauna common to a region. Extreme bioclimatic landscapes, such as 
polar or tropical, produce the greatest disadvantages. 
We now explain the method and variables employed to determine which factors 
influence agricultural labour productivity. We used a linear function to perform the 
estimation, including the variables in logarithms
4
 and employing the panel data technique. 
The functional form is based on the production function translog
5
, to which we have added 
                                                          
4
 To make the production function linear and be able to estimate the econometric model we have 
applied logarithms to it. 
5
 The translog production function is a generalization of Cobb-Douglas and is more flexible than the 
latter. The Cobb-Douglas production function is the same function, assuming βij= 0. The production 
function used (translog) relaxes the implications of additivity and homogeneity (Christensen et al. 
1973). Allen (2009) and Pablo-Romero and Gómez Calero (2013) are two recent examples of an 
estimation of the translog production function. 
15 
 
several institutional and geographical variables. The sample comprises 32 European 
countries and annual data for 1950-2006
6
.  
The equation proposed is: 
 
ln(productit) = αi∑βi ln(xit) 0.5∑∑ βij ln(xit) ln(xjt) + α1ln⁡(khumansit) + α2ln(GDPpcit)
n
j=1
n
i=1
n
i=1
+ α3communistit + α4EUit + α5subsidiesit + α6openit + α7geoi ++γ1z1it +⋯
+ γT−1zT−1it+uit;⁡⁡βij = βji⁡; x = A, L, F,M, I; ⁡i = 1,… , N; ⁡t = 1,… , T⁡ 
The endogenous variable Productit measures output per worker in the agricultural 
sector; it is the quotient between net agricultural production at international 1999-2001 
prices in dollars and the active agricultural population
7
. The correct measurement of the 
labour factor would be of hours worked, but data for this variable are not available
8
. 
The x matrices are all those variables aimed at approximating the impact of 
productive factors on labour productivity (land and capital) and were obtained from 
FAOSTAT (2009) and FAO (1948-2004) or calculated by ourselves, based on these sources. 
We divided all the variables forming the x matrix by agricultural labour. Landit (A) is the 
area of arable land and permanent crops. Livestockit (L) is the stock of live animals, 
calculated using the weightings of Hayami and Ruttan (1985). Fertilizerit (F) is the sum of 
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 See Appendix. 
7
 See Appendix.  
8
 EUROSTAT offers a variable for European agriculture called the Annual Work Unit. This variable 
is not available for either all the countries or for the entire time sample. Furthermore, the calculation 
of this variable takes ad hoc assumptions into account. Therefore, in the present study we have 
preferred to maintain the active agricultural population as the relevant variable. Gollin et al. (2014b) 
have investigated in depth the possible effects of an inadequate estimation of labour productivity in 
agriculture. Their conclusion is that even after correcting the errors in the estimation, there persist 
enormous differences among countries. 
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the consumption of potassium, phosphate and nitrogen fertilisers. Machineryit (M) is the 
number of tractors. Irrigationit (I) is the area per worker equipped for irrigation
9
.  
The measure of human capital shows the Gross Enrolment Ratio in secondary 
education (khumansit). We have calculated this ratio using statistics from the World 
Development Indicators (2011) and Mitchell (2007)
10
. 
We obtain GDP per capita from Maddison (2010), expressed in 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars
11
. 
Four variables proxy the effect of institutions on productivity. Comunistit is a 
dummy which takes the value of 0 if the country does not have a centrally planned economy 
and 1 otherwise. EUit is another dummy which takes the value of 0 if the country does not 
belong to the EU (formerly the EEC) and 1 otherwise. Subsidiesit is a qualitative variable 
that takes into account whether economic policy supported the agricultural sector (value 1) 
or not (value 0). This last variable is from the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) database. We 
took into account the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA), that is to say the change in income 
after price support and direct income support as a proportion of income in the non-policy 
situation. We assume a policy of support if the NRA in the agricultural sector is greater than 
0.2, to take into account strong support for agriculture
12
. Finally, Openessit is a qualitative 
variable which takes the value of 1 when a country has an open economy and 0 when it is 
closed. To perform this classification for each year we based ourselves on Sachs and Warner 
(1995) and their classification of countries into open or closed economies. For those 
                                                          
9
 Our variables are measured in dollars, in the case of production and input quantities. We have used a 
primal analysis. Concerning the possibility of performing the dual analysis with prices, Mundlak 
(2001, 77) sees several possible reasons for the poor performance of prices, due mainly to the fact that 
duality is a micro theory, and therefore applications with macro data present additional problems. 
10
 See Appendix. 
11
 For more details, see Appendix 
12
 See Appendix. 
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countries or years for which these authors do not offer data, we have used, complementarily, 
the World Development Indicators and Maddison (1991). 
Physical geography, geoi, is measured through the percentage of the area of each 
country in distinct bioclimatic regions (western, Mediterranean and polar). A bioclimatic 
zone or biome is a zone of the planet with a common climate, vegetation and fauna. Latitude, 
temperature, precipitation and altitude define the basic characteristics of the climate of each 
zone (CIESIN 2007). The estimation omits the so-called western biome, to observe the 
disadvantage to the other two biomes. 
The variables represented by z are the time dummies included in the econometric 
model. The last year is omitted in these time dummies, to avoid perfect multicollinearity, and 
estimated as base. 
[Table 4] 
 Table 4 shows the mean and standard deviation for the European continent of the 
explanatory variables used in the econometric model and the number of countries forming 
the institutional groups. Firstly, capital endowment per worker (whether in machinery, 
fertilisers, irrigation or animals) has increased very significantly. The increase in land per 
worker was also remarkable, rising by 400%. Lastly, the standard deviation of the use per 
worker of these factors tended to increase, except for human capital at the secondary level of 
education. 
We used the panel data method to obtain the final results; it improves the efficiency 
of the estimators, since it accumulates more information on variations in the data, controls 
for individual country heterogeneity and identifies and measures effects which cross-section 
analyses do not detect. Moreover, it reduces the problem of omitted variables (Baltagi 2005; 
Hsiao 1999). Consequently, the panel data technique is more precise than its cross-section 
counterparts. 
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4. Results 
 We obtained the econometric results by an OLS estimation with pooled data, and 
also by random effects and fixed effects, to check which estimation was optimal. We used 
the Breusch-Pagan LM test and F-test (Greene 1997) to choose between the OLS and 
random and fixed effects estimations respectively. In both of them we rejected the null 
hypothesis, which corresponds to an OLS estimation. As a result, the OLS estimation is not 
included in the results table.  
 We tackled two relatively common econometric problems, heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, by the Wald (Greene 1997) and Wooldridge tests (Wooldridge 2002), 
respectively. We rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, but the p-value of the 
autocorrelation test is 0.4670, and thus we did not reject the null hypothesis of non-
autocorrelation. 
The first column in Table 5 gives the random effects estimation. Furthermore, the 
Hausman test reveals that the differences between estimators are significant, when 
comparing columns (1) against the fixed effects estimation (2). This test has a p-value which 
is null or lower than 0.05, and thus the best estimation is that of fixed effects (column 2). The 
inconvenience of this procedure is that it omits those geographical variables which are 
constant over time. 
[Table 5] 
Heteroscedasticity can be resolved using the estimation in column 3 (Panel 
Corrected Standard Error). We chose the PCSE estimation, following Beck and Katz (1995), 
as they compare the standard errors of the PCSE with FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares). The PCSE standard errors are more precise than the other estimations.  
The results of the econometric model show, firstly, that intensity in the use of 
productive factors is decisive in explaining the differences in the productivity levels of 
European agriculture in the second half of the XX century. Especially notable is the 
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importance of the land per agricultural worker variable (land), with a significant coefficient 
and the expected sign. The elasticity of this variable would be 0.49
13
. That is to say, an 
increase of 1% in this variable would increase productivity by 0.49%. This underlines that 
the increase in the land/labour ratio was a powerful determinant of labour productivity 
differences. In the second half of the XX century a highly varied and intensive process of 
rural exodus in Europe took place (Collantes and Pinilla 2011). In short, and as Table 1 
shows, the cultivated land area fell, but by much less than the labour force. As a result, one 
of the driving forces behind agricultural productivity growth came from outside agriculture 
itself. The culmination of industrialisation in many countries or its rapid advance in others, 
together with the growth of the services sector, involved a formidable rural exodus. This 
reduced, for the first time in the majority of European countries, not only the share of 
agricultural workers in the total active population, but also their numbers. Agricultural 
productivity was thus directly conditioned by the rhythm of the economic transformations 
outside it. This in turn meant an increase in the average size of farms and exploitation of the 
technology available to intensively mechanize production (Federico 2005a; Fennell 1997). 
Modern agriculture was thus able to achieve certain economies of scale, replacing workers 
by machinery.  
Naturally, this central role of increased land area per worker demanded fundamental 
changes in agriculture itself. More land per worker was only viable insofar as fewer workers 
could perform the same tasks, meaning that workers had to be more efficient. Machinery was 
from this perspective crucial, and thus the positive sign and significance for tractors per 
worker are unsurprising in explaining differences in labour productivity (an elasticity of 
0.09). The same is true of livestock units per worker (an elasticity of 0.03). New processes in 
livestock breeding and dairy, poultry, pork and beef production meant the industrialisation of 
a previously highly labour-intensive activity, one in which substantial economies of scale 
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 To calculate the elasticities in a translog production function, it is necessary to combine the value of 
the coefficient of each variable with the coefficients of its interactions. Pablo-Romero and Gómez-
Calero (2013: 79) give the concrete formula. 
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were achieved. New livestock breeding methods permitted its disassociation from the soil 
and the ecological limits for its development in countries with less favourable natural 
conditions. Briefly, it is also natural for the use of fertilisers to show the expected positive 
sign and be significant; their contribution to the raising of productivity was considerable (an 
elasticity of 0.13). 
Irrigation is another crucial variable in explaining the differences in agricultural 
labour productivity, since it has a positive sign and is significant (an elasticity of 0.05). 
Irrigation meant improving yields in arid or semiarid regions (approximately two thirds of 
irrigated lands in Europe were concentrated in France and the Mediterranean countries). In 
Spain, for example, one of the driest countries in Europe, irrigated farming accounted for 
less than one third of the agricultural land area, but for over two thirds of crop production 
(Cazcarro et al., forthcoming). 
The diffusion of technology throughout agriculture, principally through the 
incorporation of inputs from the industrial sector, is key to understanding both the levels and 
growth of labour productivity. The diffusion and adoption of the new technologies followed 
distinct paths in the European countries. In the countries with centrally planned economies 
there were clear problems of efficiency in their use, and similarly a certain lag in the 
adoption of state-of-the-art technologies (Gregory and Stuart 2001, Allen 2003). In the 
market economies, the boost to public research into R&D and structural reform policies, with 
the aim of achieving larger and more highly capitalized farms, stimulated technological 
development (Neal 2007, Houpt et al. 2010). Whatever the case, its diffusion in the 
agricultural sector was performed unequally, given the biased and localized nature of 
technological change (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Acemoglu, forthcoming).  
The variables βij, listed in Table 5, are the products of the first five inputs. The 
negative sign in the quadratic coefficients for land, fertilisers and livestock show the 
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decreasing returns of scale for these inputs. In addition, machinery and fertilisers are 
substitutes, owing to the negative sign of their crossed coefficient
14
. 
The positive and significant coefficient of the Gross Enrolment Ratio in secondary 
education shows that the improvement in education in European countries also had a 
substantial effect upon agricultural productivity. Thus, the distinct educational levels reached 
are also important in explaining differences in agricultural labour productivity.
15
. A 
secondary level of education permits the use of more advanced techniques. 
The role played by the development of the whole economy is also considerable. The 
variable GDPpcit is significant and positively related to agricultural labour productivity. This 
influence means that the agricultural sector is not alien to the economy as a whole, and that 
the degree of development of the economy is crucial to understanding differences in 
agricultural labour productivity. Good infrastructure facilitated better access to markets and, 
in general, a reduction of transaction costs, as well as better integration between the 
agricultural sector and the agrifood industry. But the high level of economic development 
also facilitated improved access to credit, the development of agricultural extension and the 
expansion of general purpose technologies with an impact on agricultural productivity. In 
summary, all these factors favoured the faster growth of agricultural productivity, thanks to 
the advantage of integration of the sector into an economy of high incomes and technological 
capacities. 
The econometric model also clearly shows that institutional variables help to 
understand the differences between distinct levels of agricultural productivity. Membership 
of either the EU or the Communist bloc are significant at 1% and show the expected sign 
(positive for the EU and negative for the centrally planned economies). Policies of subsidies 
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Allen (2009, p.425) has explained, regarding these estimated translog parameter values, that “their 
economic significance lies in their implications for elasticities of substitution”.  
15
 We attempted to use Barro-Lee’s average years of schooling from the WDI (2011). This variable is 
not significant and we prefer to include the Gross Enrolment Ratio in the final regressions.  
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to agriculture also affected productivity. In this case, the negative sign underlines that they 
depressed it. Finally, openness is not significant, and thus is not included in the final model. 
Its lack of effect upon productivity could be due to the fact that this variable represents the 
opening of the economy as a whole, and not exclusively that of the agricultural sector. In the 
most developed countries there coincided in that period a strong opening of the industrial 
sector with high agricultural protectionism. This divergence in sectorial commercial policies 
may explain the above mentioned lack of statistical significance. 
The institutional framework defined by a centrally planned economy implies that this 
system prejudiced productivity in various ways, for example by land collectivisation and 
product requisition, the control of production and prices by planners, threats to peasants 
failing to comply with state plans, or the lack of work incentives (Allen 2003; Federico 
2005a). In general, this institutional framework maintained a significant level of redundant 
labour in both agriculture and other activities; in other words, the agricultural labour force 
fell, although by less than in Western Europe (Gregory and Stuart 2001).  
Membership of the European Union (EU) has been of greater importance, generating 
not only a stable and common institutional framework but also guaranteed minimum prices 
and subsidies. These were linked, at least until the 1990s, to production levels. Furthermore, 
EU affiliation has meant the protection of trade for the primary sector in Europe, excellent 
access to member country markets and subsidies for exports to third countries, causing prices 
to exceed international market prices (García Delgado and García Grande 2005; Serrano and 
Pinilla 2011). On the one hand, it is consequently reasonable to assume that this policy 
encouraged production, providing security, stability and improved incomes for European 
farmers, who were thus able to adopt the new technologies available at an impressive 
rhythm. On the other hand, the European Union policy of price support meant that workforce 
could be retained in the agricultural sector, lowering productivity. 
The results of the model, with a negative sign of the variable Subsidiesit, makes it 
clear that the policies of the transfer of income to agriculture, by raising the revenue of 
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farmers, permitted the permanence in this activity of a volume of labour power greater than 
that which would have existed otherwise. Logically, this affected productivity negatively. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to make a considerable number of assumptions for the 
calculation of this variable, given the scarcity of the existing data, requiring us to be very 
cautious with their interpretation (see the Appendix for a detailed explanation of its 
calculation). 
 With regard to the effect of physical geography, although the final model did not 
permit the inclusion of the variable used to estimate its impact, we do have some indications 
regarding a possible relevant influence. The results obtained in the first estimation of random 
effects (column 1 in Table 5) show a significant disadvantage for the polar bioclimatic zone 
(parbpolar) compared to the western zone, which is the reference. Although the coefficient 
of belonging to the Mediterranean zone (parbmediter) displays the negative sign expected, it 
is not significant. However, we previously confirmed that the irrigated land area per worker 
was significant and had a positive influence upon productivity. This shows that the enormous 
development of hydraulic works in the driest countries permitted them to compensate for 
their unfavourable environmental conditions. Long hours of sunshine, typical of the 
Mediterranean countries, permitted (with sufficient water) the development of intensive 
crops of high value and strong demand. 
Furthermore, to make our estimation more robust and to avoid possible reverse 
causality, we estimate an Instrumental Variables regression without the interactions of the 
translog function in column 4. To perform these estimations we use as instruments the 
following lagged variables (for two periods): land, livestock, irrigation, machinery, 
fertilisers, human capital and GDP per capita
16
. In the last column (G2SLS IV regression) 
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 The introduction of even bigger lags would avoid in greater measure the problems of reverse 
causality. However, as is logical, it is difficult to expect significant effects on productivity from 
changes in the use of factors in very distant periods. 
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our estimations of PCSE (column 3) are clearly robust, because the coefficients and 
significance do not change, with the exception of the variable Subsidies. 
It has not been possible to introduce any variable to proxy the influence of biological 
innovations on European agriculture, especially the selection and hybridisation of seeds and 
the introduction of new varieties (Olmstead and Rhode 2008; Pujol 2011). Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that these changes, together with the use of pesticides and herbicides, 
raised agricultural productivity; this omission could lead to the overrating of the importance 
of the variables that we have included in our model. 
 
5. Dynamic specification: a further step  
 We have shown in Section 2 that differences among the European levels of 
agricultural labour productivity did not decrease after 1950, as sigma convergence does not 
exist. Nevertheless, we believe it is interesting to investigate whether the different rhythms 
of the growth in labour productivity were conditioned by their initial level; that is to say, we 
have attempted to verify the existence of unconditional beta convergence
17
. To do this, we 
have performed an analysis with a dynamic specification, namely an analysis with the 
growth of agricultural labour productivity as the endogenous variable and the initial period 
of the endogenous variable as an explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the 
quinquennial logarithmic growth rates of agricultural labour productivity
18
. We performed 
this estimation using panel data methodology and a linear regression. The first column of 
Table 6 offers our results. The coefficient is negative and significant at 10%, meaning that 
the initial level of labour productivity affected the growth of this variable, and thus 
unconditional convergence existed. The speed of convergence was 1.23%. 
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 For some authors, if sigma convergence does not exist, there is no interest in investigating the 
existence of beta convergence (Quah, 1993). However, for others, the study of how far the initial 
levels condition subsequent growth (beta convergence) is interesting in itself (Sala-i-Martin, 1994). 
18
We performed the same estimation with decennial growth rates. The principal results did not change. 
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This analysis involves accepting the hypothesis that the technologies, environments 
or institutions of all countries are similar, which is clearly unrealistic, since it would imply 
that all countries display the same stationary state. Consequently, we have also tried to 
propose a model to which we add as explanatory variables (at the beginning of each five-
year period) the initial level of those used in the model from the previous section. They are 
in logarithms. Thus, we can test for the existence of conditional convergence. We follow the 
same estimation procedure as in the previous section. The equation used for the estimation 
is:  
ln(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1) =𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1) +
+∑𝛾𝑖 ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿1ln⁡(𝑘ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿3𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝛿4𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + ⁡𝛿6𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The results in Table 6 show that convergence becomes stronger and notably more 
rapid (6.9%) if we include the explanatory variables for the initial period
19
. In explaining the 
growth of agricultural labour productivity, the initial level of productivity is negative and 
significant; that is to say, the lower the initial level of productivity the greater is its growth. 
The results confirm the existence of different stationary states towards which countries 
converge, depending on their initial technologies, environments and institutions (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1992). The variables which determine the different stationary states are the 
land-labour ratio and machinery per worker. These variables are determinant in explaining 
the growth of agricultural labour productivity, as they are positive and significant. Thus, the 
availability of more highly mechanized agriculture and a higher land-labour ratio at the 
outset facilitate greater agricultural productivity growth. In summary, the use of machinery 
on large farms helps certain economies of scale to be achieved. This result confirms the 
argument proposed by O’Brien and Prados (1992, 534), which signals that “by comparison 
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 The Hausman test recommends a fixed effects estimation. Subsequently, we performed the PCSE 
estimation (column 4). 
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the long-term growth of most other continental economies seems constrained by a historical 
legacy of higher population densities coupled with unfavourable land-labour ratios”.  
If we include time dummies in the dynamic specification, the principal results do not 
change, although the percentage of polar land becomes significant. This could reinforce the 
influence of geography on agricultural productivity. Besides, the non-significance of the 
Mediterranean area may show that certain geographical obstacles can be solved by 
investment in irrigation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In recent decades the debate regarding the causes of long-term growth in agriculture 
has been one of the most intense and lively in economics. Together with the variables which 
have usually been taken into account, the so-called proximate causes, this debate has 
broadened its scope by considering further causes, termed fundamental, which are key to 
explaining such growth. Economic historians have played an important role in the debate, 
especially if we bear in mind that the contributions of Douglas North and others have been 
decisive in introducing the role of institutions into the debate regarding growth. 
The European economy grew at an extraordinarily fast rate between 1950 and 1973. 
The oil crisis meant a sharp halt to this trajectory which, although it would restart from the 
1980s onwards, would not recover the high rates of the Golden Age. Especially in the 
explanation of the Golden Age, extensive literature has discussed its causes. In general 
terms, economic historians, in distinction to agricultural economists, have not paid excessive 
attention to events in the agricultural sector, despite the importance of its changes. 
Furthermore, the discussion regarding the reasons stimulating them has not been tackled 
from a long-term perspective and for the European continent as a whole. 
The present study is aimed at filling this void. Our contribution has attempted to 
connect to the more general discussion regarding the causes of economic growth. In the same 
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way as in the more general debate regarding growth in the Golden Age, technological, 
institutional, structural change or post-war shock hypotheses have been counterposed; we 
believe that agricultural growth must be explained by a combination of proximate and 
fundamental causes. In summary, this requires analysing the income gap which exists among 
the diverse countries (Gollin et al., 2014 a). 
In the last fifty years agriculture has undergone far-reaching transformations, causing 
the greatest increase in labour productivity in the last two centuries. Agricultural production 
more than doubled but utilized only twenty per cent of the workers in 2005 compared to 
1950. However, although in Europe in this same period productivity growth was extremely 
rapid, the differences among countries were maintained. The great dispersion of 
productivities existing in 1950 has not been reduced in the framework of a rapid and 
generalised increase of such productivities in all countries. 
This study has shown that in addition to the variables normally included in a 
production function, or proximate causes of growth, the so-called fundamental causes also 
play an important role in explaining differences in agricultural labour productivity. 
Among the proximate causes, the results underline the crucial role of land 
endowment per worker in explaining labour productivity differences. Since the cultivated 
area fell slightly in most European countries, the sharp differences in the land/labour ratio 
were marked above all by the distinct intensities of the rural exodus process and by initial 
differences. These results coincide with those of other studies, whether for Europe in earlier 
dates or for comparisons with other groups of countries (Sharma et al. 1990; Van Zanden 
1991; O’Brien and Prados 1992; Gollin et al., 2014 a). 
The increase in land endowment per worker was accompanied by extremely 
intensive mechanization. Differential capital endowment per worker, fertilisers and, above 
all, tractors and harvesters, were thus essential. In conclusion, the continuous exodus of 
labour power from the sector, coupled with the increased use of productive factors 
originating in other sectors of the economy, caused the efficiency of agricultural workers to 
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rise. The different relative importance of these processes across countries largely explains 
why labour productivity differences did not decrease and convergence did not exist.  
These results enrich the debate on the relationship between economic growth and 
agricultural transformation. The acceleration of economic growth and the advanced stage of 
demographic transition generated a strong demand for labour in industry and the service 
sector (Temin 2002). New technological options (mainly self-propelled machines) meant that 
the response to the rural exodus was intensive mechanization on Europe’s farms. The 
differences in agricultural labour productivity in Europe were therefore conditioned by 
distinct levels of development in different countries.  
In turn, institutions also affected differences in productivity. We detected a direct 
relation between membership of the EU and the productivity of agricultural labour. By 
contrast, this relationship is reversed in the case of Communist bloc membership. Policies of 
support for agriculture negatively affected agricultural productivity, as they retained active 
population which otherwise would have abandoned the sector. This demonstrates the 
importance of the institutional framework in explaining differences in economic growth, and 
in our case in agricultural productivity. Furthermore, these results clarify the debate on state 
intervention in agriculture. EU policies tended to raise agricultural productivity, while the 
total intervention practiced in the centrally planned economies depressed it
20
. Given the 
contradiction between the boost to productivity of membership of the EU and the negative 
effect of support for agriculture, subsidising it as in the case of the CAP, it is reasonable to 
believe that the stimulation of productivity was above all the result of the existence of an 
integrated market, with the progressive abolition of trade barriers among members. Access to 
a large market, with the possibility of obtaining certain economies of scale, must have 
favoured the growth of productivity, stimulating technological improvement. Furthermore, 
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Obviously, European Union policies also had other effects (e.g. protection or welfare); see Federico 
(2009). 
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policies of structural reforms could have played an important role, as they made the 
achievement of economies of scale and the modernization of farms possible. 
The impact of geography on productivity differences, important in traditional 
agriculture, appears in the second half of the XX century, especially through cold weather 
and aridity. Furthermore, this latter impact must have been reduced by the extension of 
irrigated farming to the extremely arid Mediterranean countries, whose high insolation and 
sufficient water made them highly competitive and substantial producers and exporters of 
horticultural products. This specialisation, already underway in the second half of the XIX 
century, was also notably consolidated in the XX century (Pinilla and Ayuda 2010). Lastly, 
the obstacle for the Scandinavian countries of their extreme climate was not compensated for 
by the new agricultural technologies employed, which would partly explain the 
disappointing performance of such countries in terms of labour productivity.  
The dynamic model, finally, helps to understand the determinants of agricultural 
labour productivity growth. The existence of different initial conditions among countries also 
implies that there are different stationary states. The availability of more highly mechanized 
agriculture and a higher land-labour ratio at the outset facilitate greater agricultural 
productivity growth. 
 
 
Table 1 
Labour productivity, production and productive factors in European agriculture, 1950-
2005  
Europe 
Ag. labour 
productivity 
($) 
Net ag. 
prod. 
($000,000) 
Active ag. 
pop. (000 
people) 
Arable land 
and 
permanent 
crops (000 
hectares) 
Tractors 
(000 units) 
Chemical 
fertilizers 
(000 tonnes) 
Live animals 
(000 units of 
cattle) 
1950 1,388 94,319 66,365 150,517 960 6,966 131,849 
1962 2,378 129,713 54,592 151,854 4,002 14,803 155,744 
1972 3,815 156,730 41,125 142,750 6,530 27,388 163,866 
1982 6,173 187,643 30,418 140,337 8,945 31,676 175,453 
1992 8,726 193,139 22,143 136,378 9,658 20,865 162,536 
2000 11,661 195,392 16,762 131,313 9,520 19,834 148,442 
2005 13,627 193,760 14,218 126,741 9,722 19,831 142,230 
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Annual 
rates of  
growth 
4.14 2.69 -1.61 0.07 12.63 6.48 1.40 1950-1962 
1962-1972 5.31 1.91 -2.79 -0.62 5.02 6.35 0.51 
1972-1982 4.93 1.82 -2.97 -0.17 3.20 1.47 0.69 
1982-1992 3.52 0.29 -3.13 -0.29 0.77 -4.09 -0.76 
1992-2005 3.49 0.02 -3.35 -0.56 0.05 -0.39 -1.02 
1950-2005 4.23 1.32 -2.76 -0.31 4.3 1.92 0.14 
Net agricultural production is in millions of international dollars, at 1999-2001 prices. All the data are 
triennial averages, except agricultural labour productivity, fertilizers, tractors, live animals, arable land 
and agricultural active population for 1950. The data for production in 1950 is the average between 
the data for 1950 and 1951. See the Appendix for more details on the data or countries included. 
Source: Authors’ calculation, from FAOSTAT (2009) and FAO (1948-2004) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Agricultural labour productivity, 1950-2005 (international 1999-2001 prices in dollars 
per worker) and annual growth rates from 1950 to 2005 
  1950 1962 1972 1982 1992 2000 2005 1950-2005 
GFR/Germany 1,591 3,988 7,911 12,290 17,237 26,003 31,037 5.45 
GDR 1,881 2,985 5,442 7,401 - - - - 
Austria 1,207 3,078 5,488 9,539 11,351 16,555 18,284 5.07 
Belgium-Luxembourg 4,933 9,906 19,008 30,185 42,341 53,281 58,360 4.59 
Denmark 4,661 8,818 11,584 20,757 28,575 40,342 49,308 4.38 
France 2,194 5,452 9,597 16,436 25,659 37,584 44,881 5.64 
Ireland 2,777 4,435 7,464 12,521 19,671 21,948 21,625 3.80 
Netherlands 4,712 9,675 18,142 28,311 32,267 33,997 35,635 3.75 
Switzerland 3,581 5,613 7,641 10,494 10,158 11,559 12,859 2.35 
United Kingdom 5,775 9,857 15,051 19,119 23,660 25,428 26,132 2.78 
Western Europe 2,935 6,285 10,756 17,397 24,040 30,522 33,774 4.54 
Greece 1,774 1,837 2,974 4,613 6,788 8,057 8,355 2.86 
Italy 1,464 2,863 5,290 8,979 12,795 19,122 23,006 5.14 
Portugal 1,211 1,752 2,215 1,897 3,490 4,377 4,892 2.57 
Spain 1,330 2,017 3,451 6,127 10,361 16,043 18,001 4.85 
Mediterranean E. 1,426 2,334 3,961 6,255 9,551 13,459 15,259 4.40 
Finland 1,093 2,674 3,715 5,705 7,798 10,666 13,476 4.67 
Norway 2,115 3,163 4,758 6,453 7,815 9,082 10,190 2.90 
Sweden 3,665 5,111 6,883 9,816 11,511 16,050 18,137 2.95 
Nordic Europe 2,140 3,634 5,004 7,374 9,186 12,197 14,297 3.51 
Albania 360 472 593 691 697 1,048 1,191 2.20 
Bulgaria 607 1,221 2,597 4,673 6,240 10,195 12,022 5.58 
Czechoslovakia 1,324 2,212 3,824 5,156 6,549 6,608 7,576 3.22 
Hungary 1,153 1,803 3,386 6,346 7,471 10,018 12,634 4.45 
Poland 1,033 1,438 1,835 2,432 2,805 3,290 3,920 2.45 
Romania 392 656 1,169 2,182 2,504 3,531 5,835 5.03 
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Yugoslavia 363 545 888 1,935 3,180 4,038 5,323 5.00 
Central and Eastern Europe 679 1,030 1,631 2,703 3,332 4,073 5,138 3.75 
Europe 1,388 2,378 3,815 6,173 8,726 11,661 13,627 4.24 
 
The data for the groups of countries are weighted averages. All the figures are calculated using 
triennial averages (net production at international prices in dollars for 1999-2001, divided by the total 
active agricultural population), except for 1950. The calculation for Germany in 1950 has been made 
considering its productivity as if it were a single country, its value being 1,676. For more details, see 
the Appendix. 
Source: Authors’ calculation, from FAOSTAT (2009) and FAO (1948-2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1.Land productivity in European agriculture (international 1999-2001 prices in 
dollars per hectare) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation, from FAOSTAT (2009) and FAO (1948-2004) 
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Graph 2. Land-labour ratio in European agriculture, 1950-2005
 
Source: Authors’ calculation, from FAOSTAT (2009) and FAO (1948-2004) 
 
 
Table 3. Dispersion measures of agricultural labour productivity 
 
Variance of 
logarithm of 
labour 
productivity 
Coefficient 
of variation Theil Herfindahl Gini 
Weighted 
Coefficient of 
variation 
1950 0.6073 0.7223 0.0763 0.0681 0.2689 0.7466 
1955 0.6454 0.7119 0.0754 0.0674 0.2686 0.7665 
1960 0.6422 0.7449 0.0802 0.0695 0.2511 0.7941 
1965 0.6420 0.7487 0.0807 0.0698 0.2563 0.8327 
1970 0.7023 0.7937 0.0884 0.0728 0.2580 0.9044 
1975 0.6423 0.7804 0.0846 0.0719 0.2459 0.8497 
1980 0.6767 0.8041 0.0894 0.0735 0.2583 0.8546 
1985 0.6551 0.7822 0.0861 0.0720 0.2610 0.8589 
1990 0.6040 0.7482 0.0797 0.0697 0.2644 0.8478 
1995 0.6742 0.7981 0.0890 0.0731 0.2877 0.9132 
2000 0.6646 0.7692 0.0846 0.0711 0.2891 0.9014 
2005 0.5981 0.7593 0.0811 0.0705 0.2764 0.8727 
All the figures are calculated using triennial averages, except for 1950. Furthermore, the same number 
of countries has been maintained, aggregating the individual country data following the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The active agricultural population percentages for each country as a 
proportion of the total are used as weightings in the weighted coefficient of variation. 
Source: Authors’ calculation, from FAOSTAT (2009) 
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Table 4.Summary statistics of the explanatory variables and number of countries 
within each institutional variable 
 
  1950 1962 1972 1982 1992 2000 2005 
Land per 
worker Mean 2.69 3.48 4.51 5.64 7.39 9.59 11.14 
 St. Dev. 1.42 2.08 2.70 3.43 4.39 6.01 7.30 
Fertilizers 
per worker Mean 0.20 0.50 1.12 1.57 1.47 1.65 1.95 
 St. Dev. 0.23 0.48 0.89 1.13 1.28 1.38 1.47 
Tractors per 
worker Mean 0.03 0.14 0.30 0.48 0.62 0.75 0.87 
 St. Dev. 0.06 0.14 0.25 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.60 
Live 
animals per 
worker Mean 3.32 5.12 7.43 10.16 12.51 15.18 16.48 
 St. Dev. 2.53 4.32 6.74 9.01 11.45 14.58 15.28 
Irrigation 
(ha.) per 
worker Mean 0.12 0.17 0.34 0.59 0.89 1.23 1.35 
 St. Dev. 0.16 0.21 0.34 0.60 0.86 1.17 1.41 
Human 
capital 
(secondary) Mean 32.00 57.93 75.12 85.31 96.11 102.39 99.81 
 St. Dev. 17.53 24.19 16.06 13.29 13.75 19.04 11.10 
GDPpc Mean 3,774 5,823 8,588 10,437 12,031 14,709 16,402 
 St. Dev. 2,190 3,005 3,932 4,468 6,085 7,252 7,595 
Institutions 
(number of 
countries) Communist 7 8 8 8 2 1 0 
 EU 0 5 5 9 11 14 19 
 Subsidies 11 13 12 14 17 20 17 
 Open 5 15 16 16 24 28 28 
Source: Authors’ calculation, from FAOSTAT (2009) and FAO (1948-2004). 
The data are triennial averages, except for 1950 and the data for institutions. Albania is omitted in 
1950 because of the non-availability of data. To construct this table, we maintain the same number of 
countries, except for secondary human capital after 1992, since we cannot aggregate the gross 
enrolment ratio. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Econometric results 
 RE FE PCSE G2SLS (IV) 
Land (a) -.0957 .4866*** .6576*** .5309*** 
 .0797 .1003 .0959 .0283 
Livestock (l) .0800*** .0464*** .0512*** .0063*** 
 .0059 .0042 .0035 .0011 
Fertilizer (f)  .2223*** .1655*** .0685** .1033*** 
 .0593 .0481 .0308 .0109 
Machinery (m)  .3502*** .0775** .1372*** .0853*** 
 .0349 .0308 .0413 .0107 
Irrigation (i) .1050*** .0948*** .0595** .0185*** 
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 .0206 .0256 .0244 .0069 
Human Capital .0573*** .1371*** .0821*** .1519*** 
 .0056 .0146 .0105 .0161 
Communist -.1675*** -.1058*** -.1187*** -.1290*** 
 .0203 .0209 .0184 .0191 
EU .0900*** .0538*** .0580*** .0225* 
 .0170 .0120 .0107 .0135 
Subsidies -.0655*** -.0323*** -.0295** -.0134 
 .0181 .0125 .0125 .0142 
GDPpc .2637*** .1191*** .1956*** .2378*** 
 .0187 .0307 .0259 .0294 
βaa .1738*** -.0379 -.0907** - 
 .0369 .0449 .0448  
βff -.0464** -.0462*** -.0425*** - 
 .0217 .0148 .0127  
βmm .0133** -.0021 -.0034 - 
 .0066 .0055 .0053  
βll .0002 -.0006*** -.0006*** - 
 .0002 .0001 .0001  
βii .0121*** .0218*** .0205*** - 
 .0025 .0039 .0038  
βam -.1152*** -.0238** -.0171 - 
 .0132 .0119 .0120  
βaf .0313 -.0024 .0042 - 
 .0213 .0155 .0138  
βal -.0231*** -.0047** -.0060*** - 
 .0023 .0019 .0017  
βmf -.0703*** -.0417*** -.0464*** - 
 .0148 .0102 .0098  
βml .0082*** .0024 .0018 - 
 .0020 .0015 .0015  
βfl -.0028 .0007 .0006 - 
 .0021 .0014 .0012  
βia -.0164** -.0196* .0041 - 
 .0078 .0105 .0096  
βim .0107*** -.0053* -.0080*** - 
 .0033 .0029 .0030  
βif -.0015 -.0050 -.0071** - 
 .0060 .0041 .0036  
βil .0021*** .0019*** .0019*** - 
 .0007 .0005 .0004  
Parbpolar -.5736*** - - - 
 .0254    
Parbmediter -.0138 - - - 
 .0256    
Constant 6.6418*** 7.9223*** .0002 7.0712*** 
 .2161 .3845 .0024 .3522 
R^2 within 0.9669 0.9795 0.8982 0.9643 
No. 
observations 1,411 1,411 1,411 1,347 
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The data below the coefficients are the standard deviations. The coefficients *, ** and *** 
are significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. The variables in the PCSE estimation are transformed into 
deviations according to their individual, temporal and overall average. The interaction coefficients β 
have a subscript corresponding to the first five variables. The letters in parentheses, close to the name 
of the variables, correspond to the sub-index in the group of β. All the variables are in logarithms, 
except parbpolar, parbmediter, comunist, eu and subsidies. We have not included in the table the 
elevated number of time dummies in the model. The coefficients and their standard deviations are 
available on request. The value of R^2 within the PCSE estimation corresponds to R^2. 
 
 
Table 6. Results of dynamic specification 
 PCSE RE FE PCSE RE robust 
Productivity -.0123* -.0446*** -.0839*** -.0691*** -.0435*** 
 .0072 .0133 .0161 .0163 .0146 
Land - .0319*** .0636*** .0628*** .0305** 
  .0111 .0176 .0197 .0149 
Livestock - .0001 .0001 -.0001 -.0001 
  .0006 .0006 .0004 .0004 
Fertilisers - -.0001 -.0001 .0017 .0033 
  .0053 .0054 .0042 .0048 
Machinery - .0126*** .0173*** .0235*** .0178** 
  .0042 .0052 .0078 .0084 
Irrigation - -.0045* -.0044 -.0053 -.0025 
  .0026 .0040 .0030 .0024 
GDPpc - .0028 -.0067 -.0034 .0092 
  .0115 .0146 .0162 .0146 
Human capital - .0018 .0149* -.0049 .0064 
  .0043 .0088 .0057 .0051 
Communist - -.0033 .0050 .0147 -.0025 
  .0101 .0112 .0133 .0159 
EU - -.0042 -.0013 -.0012 -.0037 
  .0074 .0075 .0067 .0087 
Subsidies - -.0025 -.0089 -.0098 -.0084 
  .0074 .0075 .0072 .0110 
Parbpolar - -.0404 - - -.0567*** 
  .0250   .0195 
Parbmediter - .0005 - - .0121 
  .0224   .0229 
Constant .0000 .3839*** .8880*** -.0002 .3487** 
 .0019 .1327 .2168 .0017 .1479 
Time dummies No No No No Yes 
R^2 within 0.0145 0.1588 0.1833 0.1423 0.1866    
No. observations 303 303 303 303 303 
The data below the coefficients are the standard deviations. The coefficients *, ** and *** 
are significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. The variables in the PCSE estimation are transformed into 
deviations according to their individual, temporal and overall average. All the variables are in 
logarithms, except parbpolar, parbmediter, communist, eu and subsidies. We have not included in the 
table the high number of time dummies in the model. The coefficients and their standard deviations 
are available on request. The value of R^2 within the PCSE estimation corresponds to R^2. 
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